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Dzivi: Torts

TORTS
Bart Dzivi
This survey presents a brief discussion of some recent cases
which have affected the development of tort law in Montana. The
topics discussed include res ipsa loquitor, strict liability in tort,
defamation, damages, and assumption of risk. The purpose of this
survey is to summarize the facts, reasoning, and policies contained
in the cases which brought forth important modifications or clarifications of tort law.
I.

RES IPSA LOQUITOR

In Thompkins v. Northwestern Trust Co.1 the Montana Supreme Court held that it was reversible error for the trial court to
refuse a res ipsa loquitor instruction in a wrongful death action
arising out of an airplane crash.2 In reaching that result, the court
effectively overruled the line of Montana cases$ which held that
exclusive control of the defendant was a necessary element of res
ipsa loquitor. The court later stated in Brothers v. General Motors
Corp.,4 that the issue of exclusive control would be given weight in
determining which situations are appropriate for application of res
ipsa loquitor.5
The pilot in Thompkins was relatively inexperienced.' On
September 19, 1978, he rented a plane for the purpose of taking
three passengers from Missoula to Bozeman. At approximately
4:00 p.m., a half hour after take-off, the plane crashed into a 5500
foot hill fifteen miles southwest of Drummond. The wreckage of
the plane, beginning with the tail cone, spread out along a 2075
foot line.'
The passengers' heirs brought an action against the pilot's es1. Mont. , 645 P.2d 402 (1982).
2. "Without any evidence, other than the happening of the accident itself, res ipsa
applies where an airplane crashes into the side of a hill." Id. at -, 645 P.2d at 408.
3. Id. at , 645 P.2d at 413 (Weber, J., dissenting). Justice Weber states that in
addition to overruling Knowlton v. Sandaker, 150 Mont. 438, 436 P.2d 98 (1968); Little v.
Grizzly Mfg., Mont. __,
636 P.2d 839 (1981); and Whitney v. N.W. Greyhound Lines,
125 Mont. 528, 242 P.2d 257 (1952), the decision has the effect of placing the entire status of
res ipsa loquitor in doubt.
4. __
Mont.
, 658 P.2d 1108 (1983).
5. Id. at P.2d at 1111.
6. Pilot Herschel Moore had a total of seventy-one hours of flying time, of which
twenty-three hours were solo time. Moore was not instrument rated. He had received his
pilots' license just one month before the accident. His instructor, however, described Moore
as an excellent student pilot. Thompkins, - Mont. , 645 P.2d at 403.
7. Id. at , 645 P.2d at 408.
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tate. At trial, the plaintiffs' expert s testified that he believed this
case was a classic example of an inexperienced pilot becoming disoriented in bad weathers and putting the plane into a nose-down
spiral turn. During such a spiral, a plane would exceed its structural capabilities and break apart. The expert assumed the tail
cone fractured first because of its position in the trail of wreckage. 10 The defense's experts " testified about the sequence of the
breakup. Based upon the trail of wreckage, they did not believe it
was possible that the tail cone broke off first. They testified that
12
equipment failure, not pilot disorientation, caused the accident.
The case went to the jury, but the trial court refused to give a
res ipsa loquitor instruction. 3 The trial court was following the rationale of Mets v. Granrud 4 in which the supreme court held that
the res ipsa loquitor doctrine was inapplicable in one-car accidents
with no eyewitness testimony and conflicting expert testimony
about the cause."8 The jury in Thompkins apparently found the
defense's theory of equipment failure more convincing than the
plaintiffs' theory of pilot error. One of the issues raised on plaintiffs' appeal was whether or not a res ipsa loquitor instruction
should have been given.
The theory behind res ipsa loquitor is that negligence may be
8. Jeffrey Morrison, an experienced flyer in the region, testified as to the cause of the
accident. Id. at , 645 P.2d at 409.
9. A meterologist testified about the weather conditions in Drummond on the day of
the accident. From 1:30 p.m. to 3:45 p.m., there was a ceiling of broken clouds which had
lifted from 3500 to 4000 feet. Visibility was twelve miles. There was precipitation in an area
fifteen to twenty miles southwest of Drummond. Id. at -,
645 P.2d at 404.
10. Id. at -,
645 P.2d at 409.
11. Sheldon Roberts and James R. "Bob" Jensen were engineering consultants from
California. Justice Sheehy, in a separate concurrence, based his decision on the fact "that
the jury was flim-flammed by the impressive degrees and background of the two wise men
from California." Id. at -,
645 P.2d at 408-09.
12. Id.
13. Id. at -,
645 P.2d at 404.
14. Mont. , 606 P.2d 1384 (1980).
15. Id. at , 606 P.2d at 1387-88. Mets involved a car crash into a telephone pole.
The passenger was killed and the driver suffered an extensive injury causing his memory to
lapse. The accident occurred on a dry curve, with no skid marks left from the accident. A
Montana Highway Patrolman testified that the cause of the accident was the failure of the
pitman arm. Another expert testified that the pitman arm broke upon the impact of the
collision. The court stated:
In such a situation, the balance of probabilities between, first, causes of an
accident involving the vehicle which are due to lack of care on the part of the
driver, and second, causes of an accident not due to lack of reasonable care are so
nearly equal that a conclusion that the driver was negligent cannot reasonably be
found and would be mere speculation. This conclusion is further supported by the
conflicting opinions of the experts ... concerning the accident.
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inferred in some accidents simply from the circumstances. 1e In
Thompkins, the court expressly overruled Mets, adopted the rationale of the Restatement (Second) of Torts1 7 and stated that
"[elxclusive control is merely one fact which establishes the responsibility of the defendant; and if it can be established otherwise, exclusive control is not essential to a res ipsa loquitor case."1
The court refused to strictly follow the reasoning in Campbell v.
First National Bank 9 in which a federal district court decided
that res ipsa loquitor did not apply to a case where the pilot lacked
exclusive control because he had rented the plane. Instead, the
court relied on an aircraft crash case"0 in which multiple defendants had sought to avoid application of res ipsa loquitor because
they shared control over the airplane. Exclusive control was
deemed to include joint control by codefendants.2 1 This analogy is
not persuasive, as Justice Weber pointed out in his dissent, because Thompkins concerned a single defendant.2
In Brothers v. General Motors Corp.,3 the court put to rest
any notion that the Thompkins rule on exclusive control was an
aberration limited to aircraft cases. In Brothers, the plaintiffs were
traveling in a station wagon on Interstate 90 when the driver attempted to negotiate a curve and the steering wheel did not respond. No evidence of any defect was found. After defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, plaintiffs appealed. In
reaching its decision that res ipsa loquitor did not apply, the supreme court cited Thompkins for the proposition that although
''exclusive control over the situation is not a necessary element of a
res ipsa case, we have nevertheless acknowledged that exclusive
16. See W. PROSSER,

LAW OF TORTS §
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

39 (4th Ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
§ 328 D provides:
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence
of the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which does not occur in the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated bythe evidence;
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the
plaintiff.
(2) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to be
drawn where different conclusions may be reasonably reached.
18. Thompkins, - Mont. at , 645 P.2d at 406 (quoting from RESTATEMENT
(SECoND) OF TORTS § 328 D, comment g). In adopting this rationale, the court was forced to
expressly overrule Mets, Id. at -, 645 P.2d at 408.
19. 370 F. Supp. 1096 (D. N.M. 1973).
20. Stoddard v. Long-Temco-Vought, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 314 (C.D.Cal. 1980).
21. Id. at 321.
22. Thompkins,
Mont. at , 645 P.2d at 413.
17.

23.
24.

Mont.
658 P.2d 1108.
Id. at , 658 P.2d at 1109.
-
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control helps to establish the probable cause of the accident."26
Thompkins and Brothers illustrate a factual distinction important in res ipsa loquitor cases. In Knowlton v. Sandaker 6 the
court stated that a res ipsa loquitor instruction should not be given
when a defendant offers an equally plausible explanation.2 7 The
decedent in Knowlton was killed when he was welding in a petroleum tank that exploded. In both Brothers and Knowlton, the injured parties' conduct was a possible contributing factor in the accident. The court in Thompkins stated that because the
passengers did not contribute to the accident, the defendant could
not argue equally probable alternatives based only on conflicting
expert testimony.2
It appears the court has two different standards for determining when control is sufficiently exclusive. When the cause of the
accident is a joint responsibility of a defendant and a plaintiff, the
court will declare that the defendant's control was insufficient to
mandate a res ipsa loquitor instruction. When the cause of the accident is a joint responsibility of a defendant and a third party, the
court will reject a narrow construction of exclusive control and declare that res ipsa loquitor is applicable.
II.

STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT

In Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp.,29 the Montana Supreme Court held that a cause of action for strict liability
in tort is sufficient even though the only injury was to the product
itself.3 0 In allowing Neoma Thompson a claim for the damage to
her mobile home, the court extended the doctrine of strict liability
in tort as originally announced in Brandenburgerv. Toyota Motor
Sales."
On September 25, 1971, Neoma Thompson purchased a mobile home manufactured by Nebraska Mobile Homes Corporation
(Nebraska). Nebraska put a ninety-day warranty on every unit
produced, but consistently honored warranties for up to one year.
Thompson's home malfunctioned from the day it was installed.2
During the first winter, Thompson was constantly bothered by cold
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at -,
658 P.2d at 1111.
150 Mont. 438, 436 P.2d 98 (1968).
Id. at 447, 436 P.2d at 103.
Thompkins, - Mont. at -,
645 P.2d at 408.
- Mont. -,
647 P.2d 334 (1982).
Id. at -,
647 P.2d at 334.
162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973).
Thompson, Mont. __,
647 P.2d at 334-35.
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drafts blowing through the home. After perhaps a year,3 3 a factory
representative came out to apply caulk to her bedroom floor. By
June 1976, the ceiling had a four-inch sag. The local dealer contacted Nebraska, but the company refused to do anything because
of the time that had expired since the purchase."'
Thompson filed suit alleging negligence, breach of warranty,
fraud, and strict liability in tort. At trial, defendants' motion to
dismiss the strict liability claim was granted and the jury found for
defendants on the issues of fraud, negligence, and breach of warranty. The sole issue presented for appeal was whether the district
court had erred in granting the motion to dismiss.
In extending strict liability in tort to cases where the only injury is to the defective product, the court relied on the policy considerations stated in Brandenburger.The reasons stated for placing the economic burden on the manufacturer include: (1) he is
best able to guard against future occurrences; (2) he can obtain
insurance to cover the cost; (3) he can cover the cost by distributing it among all the consumers; and (4) he is primarily responsible
for the injury. 6
The court stated that the inequality in bargaining position was
more pronounced in cases where the only injury was to the product
itself. The difficulty in pursuing a remedy through other theories
of recovery, compounded by an attorney's reluctance to take cases
with limited damages, makes other forms of recovery impractical.3
Apparently the court hopes that by making the case easier to
prove, it will reduce the amount of time necessary to prepare such
a case and increase the chance of recovery. These factors would
increase a case's settlement value and give an attorney more economic incentive to take such a case.
This decision is consistent with the doctrine of strict liability
set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A
which limits damages to "physical harm." As one leading commentator has stated, "[t]here can be no doubt that the seller's liability
includes not only personal injury, but also property damage to the
33.
memory
34.
35.
36.

Id. at , 647 P.2d at 335. Thompson was injured in 1966 and still suffered
loss during the trial. Some of the dates of occurrences are approximations.
Id.
Id. at
, 647 P.2d at 336.
Thompson,

-

Mont.

-,

647 P.2d 336.

37. Id. at -,
647 P.2d at 337. The court also cited a number of cases from other
jurisdictions which had applied strict liability in tort where the only injury was to the product. Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Gautheir v. Mayo, 77
Mich. App. 513, 258 N.W. 748 (1977); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965). But see Seely v. White Motor Co. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965); Nobility Homes, Inc. v Shivers, 557 S.W. 2d 77 (Tex. 1977).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1983

5

MONTANA
LAW
REVIEW
Montana
Law Review, Vol.
44 [1983],
Iss. 2, Art. 13

344

[Vol. 44

defective chattel itself. ..."38

III.

DEFAMATION

In Williams v. Pasma,s9 an action for libel, the Montana Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in finding that
Larry Williams was a public figure."° In sustaining the summary
judgment, the court limited the apparently broad powers of a jury
in a libel action.' This decision gives the judge the power to decide
a question of fact-the person's alleged status as a public figure.
In 1979, Joe Pasma issued a press release to respond to a comment made by an official of the State Republican Committee, Kenneth Dunham. This political counter-attack against Dunham contained a reference to Williams, who had joined former Governor
Tim Babcock in heading a committee to promote the presidential
campaign of John Connally. The release said in part, "all three
[Williams, Babcock, and Connally] have at one time or another
been under federal indictment for political and financial
shenanigans ... ."142
This statement was incorrect because Williams had not been
indicted, but had been charged with violating federal securities
regulations.43 Pasma refused to make a formal retraction and Williams filed a libel action. Pasma moved to dismiss, alleging that
Williams was a "public figure" and no malice had been alleged.
Summary judgment was granted for Pasma, even though Williams
had amended his complaint to allege malice. An issue raised on
appeal was whether the court erred in holding that as a matter of
law Williams was a public figure."
In New York Times v. Sullivan,5 the United States Supreme
Court stated that the principles of the Constitution require that a
public official prove malice before recovering damages for libel.
Later, the Court extended this rule to public figures.'6 In Williams, the Montana Supreme Court, quoting from Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.,4 recognized that there are two types of public figures:
'In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive
38.

PROSSER,

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

-

supra note 16, at § 101.

Mont.
-, 656 P.2d 212 (1982).
Id. at -,
656 P.2d at 216
See infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
39 St. Rptr. at 2334.
Williams. at -,
656 P.2d at -,
Id.
Id. at -,
656 P.2d at 214.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 338 U.S. 130 (1967).
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes
and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and
thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In
either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions.' 8
In the present case, the court determined that Williams' activities
as a politician and investment advisor made him a public figure for
49
all purposes.
Chief Justice Haswell dissented because he did not agree that
the evidence supports the contention that Williams is as a matter
of law a public figure for all purposes.5 0 Persons such as Johnny
Carson or William Buckley may be "all-purpose public figures,"
but Chief Justice Haswell stated that the case should have gone to
the jury because there was a genuine issue as to the material fact
of Williams' status as a public figure. 1
The Montana Constitution states that "[in all suits . . . for
libel. . . the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine
the law and the facts."5 In Madison v. Yunker, 3 a libel case in
which the defendants referred to the plaintiff as a public figure,
the court stated, "[w]hatever his status, it is a question for the jury
to determine, because of the constitutional provision that the jury
under the instructions of the court is the judge of both the law and
the fact."5 ' In the present case, the court stated that this interpretation did not apply. The court relied on the earlier case of Griffin
v. Opinion PublishingCo.,5 5 which stated that "the function of the
court and jury is not greatly different in the trial of libel from what
it is in other cases." 56
A possible approach not taken by the court, would be to declare that Williams was as a matter of law a public figure for a
"limited range of issues" because he was "drawn into a particular
public controversy." Surely it could be argued that Williams was
drawn into the Pasma-Dunham exchange because of his high visibility as a former candidate for the United States Senator and his
48. Williams, - Mont. at , 656 P.2d at 215.
49. Id. at -,
656 P.2d at 216.
50. Id. at __,
656 P.2d at 218 (Haswell, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7 (1972).
53. 180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978).
54. Madison, 185 Mont. at 56, 589 P.2d at 133.
55. 114 Mont. 502, 138 P.2d 580 (1943).
56. Williams at , 656 P.2d at 215 (quoting from Griffin v. Opinion Publishing Co.,
114 Mont. 502, 512, 138 P.2d 580, 586 (1943)).
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position in the Connally committee. Such an approach could protect the idea of open political expression contained in Sullivan and
at the same time protect persons similarly situated to Williams
from libelous comments made outside of the political forum.

IV.

DAMAGES

In two recent cases the Montana Supreme Court faced the issue of what amount of damages is appropriate in cases where a
defendant has harassed the plaintiff with unmeritorious litigation.
In Miller v. Watkins,57 the defendant had caused criminal proceedings to be instituted against the plaintiff. In Johnson v. Murray, 8 the defendant filed a number of purported "common law
liens" against the plaintiff. In both cases, the supreme court affirmed large damage awards for the defamation suits brought in
response to the harassment suits.
Miller evolved from a dispute between partners in a horse
breeding business. The owners of the mares and the owners of the
stallions were to each take half of the resulting offspring. Miller,
however, refused to divide the colt crop in accordance with the
terms of the contract. Watkins, the owner of the stallions, refused
to accept any more mares for breeding. In 1978, Miller told brand
inspectors that Watkins stole some of his horses. Actually, all of
the allegedly stolen horses had either been sold, traded, or given as
a distribution pursuant to the contract. Miller and the brand inspectors then approached county attorneys, who filed a number of
horse theft charges against Watkins. The police arrested Watkins
and he spent a night in jail. All criminal charges were eventually
dismissed with prejudice.5 9
Miller brought an action for breach of contract. Watkins
counter-claimed for malicious prosecution, libel and slander. The
trial court, sitting without a jury, found for Watkins and awarded
damages of $30,000 for malicious prosecution; and for the libel and
slander it awarded $25,000 in actual damages and $50,000 punitive
damages.6 0
One of the issues raised on Miller's appeal was the amount of
the damages. The record indicated that Watkins suffered humiliation, embarrassment, and damage to business resulting from the
57. Mont. -,
653 P.2d 126 (1982).
58. Mont. _, 656 P.2d 170 (1982).
59. Miller, - Mont. -,
653 P.2d at 128-30.
60. Id. at _, 653 P.2d at 127. The trial court also awarded Watkins $23,000 for
breach of contract, set off against $1500 due to Miller for the payment of one horse.
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defamatory statements and malicious prosecution. 1 The supreme
court upheld the $55,000 general damages and cited Keller v.
Safeway Stores, Inc.,6 2 in support of the proposition that defamation awards would rarely be changed.6 3 Since $30,000 of this
amount resulted from malicious prosecution, the court has apparently decided to give these damages the same preferential treatment that it gives defamation awards.
In discussing punitive damages, the court stated that the
Montana statute6 4 allowed such damages "for the sake of example
and by way of punishing the defendant. '' 65 The court relied on
Smith v. Krutar6 6 to state that the statute allows such damages
where the acts were willful. Because Miller knowingly made false
accusations over a period of three6 7years, the court held this was a
proper case for punitive damages.
The supreme court had a further opportunity to expound its
position on damage awards on a suit for defamation and slander of
title in Johnson v. Murray. 8 In a four to three decision the court
upheld a default judgment of $100,000 in general damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages."9
Duane Bratland, a highway patrolman subordinate to Ron
Johnson, gave Daniel Murray a five dollar speeding ticket. In response, Murray filed a document-prepared without assistance of
counsel-demanding $1,050,007 from Ron Johnson and his wife,
Marilee. The charges, basically claiming intimidation, were dismissed by the justice court for lack of jurisdiction. Murray also
filed documents purporting to put a common law lien upon the
Johnson's real property and to attach their personal property. The
Johnsons unsuccessfully attempted to get Murray to remove the
alleged liens. 0
On May 27, 1981, the Johnsons filed suit for defamation and
slander of title. Murray's answer was not filed in time, because he
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at -, 653 P.2d at 132.
111 Mont. 28, 41, 108 P.2d 605, 612-13 (1940).
653 P.2d at 132.
Miller, - Mont. at __,
MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 27-1-221 (1981) which provides:

In any action for a breach of an obligation not arising
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice,
jury, in addition to actual damages, may give damages for
by way of punishing the defendant.
65. Miller, - Mont. at -, 653 P.2d at 132.
66. 153 Mont. 325, 457 P.2d 459 (1969).
Mont. at -, 653 P.2d at 132.
67. Miller,
,
P.2d -, 39 St. Rptr. 2257
Mont.
68. __
69. Justices Morrison, Weber, and Shea dissented.
Mont. at -, 656 P.2d at 172.
70. Johnson, at __
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was late in paying the filing fee. On September 16, 1981 a default
judgment was entered, and thirteen days later the district court
held a hearing at which it determined the extent of the damages.
The only testimony given at the hearing was presented by the
Johnsons and a licensed abstractor. The Johnsons testified about
the humiliation they suffered; the abstractor testified that their title to real property had been clouded. The judge awarded a total of
$201,500.71
An issue raised on Murray's appeal was the amount of the
damages awarded. The supreme court stated that the record shows
the market value of the Johnsons' property was diminished, and
that they suffered humiliation and embarrassment. The court
characterized Murray's attitude as "utter disregard for the rights
and privacy of the Johnsons ... 72 The court noted that harassment was the only possible motive for bringing suit against Marilee
Johnson.73 By affirming both the general and punitive damages,
the court gave a clear signal that it would not tolerate misuse of
the judicial system by those "asserting dark and ominous common
law rights superseding our constitution and our statutes."7' 4
V.

ASSUMPTION OF RISK

The defense of assumption of risk has traveled a tortuous trail
in its recent journeys through the Montana Supreme Court. Montana's comparative negligence statute75 ended the all or nothing
approach of contributory negligence, but left questions regarding
the status of assumption of risk.76 The Montana Supreme Court's
first statement on the matter was the dictum in Kopischke v. First
Continental Corp." where the court stated, "we will follow the
71.
awarded
72.
73.
74.

75.

Id. at __,
656 P.2d at 171, 39 St. Rptr. at 2258, 2269. The plaintiff was also
$1500 in attorney fees, but the defendant did not appeal that issue.
Johnson, Mont. at -, 656 P.2d at 177, 39 St. Rptr. at 2265.
Id.
Id.
MONT. CODE ANN.

§ 27-1-702 which provides:

Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or
his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or
injury to person or property if such negligence was not greater than the negligence
of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be
diminished in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
76. As used in this article, the term assumption of risk will be used to mean implied
assumption of risk, which is voluntarily and knowingly incurring risk. Other situations also
described as assumption of risk include some type of waiver or agreement by the plaintiff
which releases the defendant of his responsibility. See supra PROSSER, note 16, § 68.
77. Mont. -, 610 P.2d 668 (1980). See Survey, 1980 Montana Supreme Court
Decisions, 42 Mont. L. Rev. 423 (1981).
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modern trend and treat assumption of risk like any other form of
contributory negligence and apportion it under the comparative
negligence statute. '7' The court, however, held in Abernathy v.
Eline Oil Field Services, Inc.,7 9 that jury instructions in negligence
actions could not contain the standards used in assumption of risk.
The court stated "that the doctrine of implied assumption of risk
is no longer applicable in Montana."8 0 This ruling expressly left
undecided the issue of the doctrine's applicability to products liability cases. 8 ' In Zahrte v. Sturm Ruger & Co. 8 1 the court held that
assumption of risk was a defense, but not a complete bar, to an
action based on strict liability.8
On January 19, 1979, David Abernathy was driving his son to
school. The road was bare, but snow was blowing. Abernathy's car
got stuck in a snow drift when he tried to drive through a snow
plow cut. After attempting to drive out, he left the car and examined the front wheels, which were buried in snow. The car was
stuck perpendicular to the traffic. At the moment Abernathy
reached into the car to get a shovel, an eight-ton truck hit the car.
Abernathy was injured and his son was killed.8 4
At trial, defendant offered an instruction which contained the
elements of assumption of risk, but was phrased in terms of contributory negligence. 5 The trial court gave the instruction, and the
jury awarded a verdict of $20,000, but barred recovery by finding
that Abernathy was seventy-five percent negligent.8 6 In Abernathy,
the supreme court stated that the policy and reasoning in
Kopischke are contrary to such an instruction. 7 The court found
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Kopischke,
Mont. at , 610 P.2d at 687.
__
Mont.
650 P.2d 772 (1982).
Id. at
, 650 P.2d at 775-76.
Id. at -,
650 P.2d at 776.
Mont. __,
661 P.2d 17 (1983).
Id. at
-, 661 P.2d at 19
Abernathy, - Mont .... 650 P.2d at 773-74.
Id. at
-, 650 P.2d at 774. The jury instruction was:
In considering whether or not David J. Abernathy was contributorily negligent, you may consider, among other aspects of contributory negligence the question whether he placed himself in a position to chance known hazards. Thus one
aspect of contributory negligence exists if you find
1. That the plaintiff had knowledge, actual or implied, of the conditions which
existed at the time of and after plaintiff's vehicle became stuck in the snow drift.
2. That he appreciates the condition as dangerous.
3. That he voluntarily remained or continued in the fact of the known dangerous
condition.
4. That injury resulted as the usual or probable consequence of this dangerous
condition.
86. Id. at _,
650 P.2d at 773.
87. Id. at -,
650 P.2d at 774.
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that the objective standard, contained in the negligence instruction, conflicted with the subjective standard, contained in the assumption of risk instruction."8 A jury could determine that the
plaintiff's conduct satisfied the reasonable person standard, but
that the plaintiff's subjective knowledge also met the elements necessary to establish assumption of risk.89 Thus, because the court
was unwilling to accept the notion of a defense of reasonable assumption of risk, it totally rejected the defense of assumption of
risk, even where the plaintiff's conduct might be unreasonable.
In Zahrte, the court decided the issue it had left open in Abernathy. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, understandably uncertain about the status of Montana law, certified a question to the
Montana Supreme Court.9 0 The court was asked if "the defense of
assumption of risk still exist[s] as a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery in a products liability action."'" In answering no, the court
stated:
[t]he defense as applied in a strict liability case involves unreasonable exposure to the danger created by the defective product.
Plaintiff must have a subjective knowledge of the danger and
then voluntarily and unreasonably expose himself to that danger ....If those elements are found to exist the defense becomes
operative and must be compared with the conduct of the defendant. The mechanics of comparison are the same as in comparison for contributory negligence. 2
Thus the court has expressly rejected the approach of section
402A, comment n of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which
states that assumption of risk is a complete defense. The comment
n approach had been adopted by the court in Brown v. North
American Mfg. Co. a3 under facts predating the enactment of the
comparative negligence statute.
The Zahrte decision has injected an element of uncertainty
into an already confused area of the law. Juries faced with products liability claims in which the assumption of risk defense is
88. Id. at -,
650 P.2d at 775.
89. Id.
661 P.2d at 17 arose from an accidental
90. Zahrte, - Mont. at -,
discharge of a revolver manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff had picked
up the gun out of a truck and put it on a porch. The gun discharged and shot
plaintiff in the head. Plaintiff alleged the gun was defective. The jury found for
the defendant and indicated on the verdict form that the plaintiff had assumed
the risk of his injury. 498 F. Supp. 389, 390 (1980).
, 661 P.2d at 17.
91. Zahrte, Mont. at 92; Id. at -, P.2d at , 40 St. Rptr. at 318-19.
93. 176 Mont. 98, 576 P.2d 711 (1978).
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raised must compare the conduct of the plaintiff with the condition of the product. A defendant with an admittedly dangerous
product may be fortunate enough to have the plaintiff unreasonably expose himself and thus avoid liability. The same defendant
with the same product might also be faced with a plaintiff who
only reasonably exposes himself to the danger, resulting in liability
for the defendant. It appears the assumption of risk defense as
now used is contrary to the policies stated by the court when it
first adopted strict liability in tort.94

94.

See supra text accompanying note 34.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1983

13

Montana Law Review, Vol. 44 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 13

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/13

14

